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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

: Case No. 910314

v.

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellee.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a
certificate of probable cause in which it held that rule 27, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, not Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10
(1990), controls the release pending appeal process.

In

substance, the trial court ruled that section 77-20-10 is
unconstitutional.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) (Supp. 1991), in that the Court has
determined that the trial court declared a statute
unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented for review is whether the
trial court erroneously held that Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10
(1990) is unconstitutional.
This issue presents a question of law subject to a
"correction of error" standard of review, under which no

deference is owed the trial court's ruling.

City of Monticello

v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.
Ct. 120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Wiilden, 768 P.2d 455,
456 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, C. Dean Larsen, was charged with numerous
offenses, including eighteen counts of securities fraud under
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) and -21 (1989) (amended 1990, 1991)
(R. 511-26 J1. After the trial court granted defendant's motion
to sever (R. 1023), defendant was tried on the eighteen counts of
securities fraud.

A jury found him guilty on all counts (R.

1434-51) .
The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison
for a term of zero to three years on all eighteen counts, three
of the terms to run consecutively to the others, which are to run
concurrently, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution on
each count (R. 1474-91).

Execution of the sentence was stayed

until resolution of the other counts charged in the information
(Ibid.).

Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for a

1

The record in this case is in the Utah Court of Appeals,
where defendant's appeal of his convictions on eighteen counts of
securities fraud has been argued and submitted for decision. The
transcript of the hearing on defendant's petition for a
certificate of probable cause has been filed in this Court.
2

certificate of probable cause (R. 1521-23) which, after a
hearing, was granted2 (see Appendix A; T. 45-48).

In granting

the certificate, the court held that rule 27, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, rather than Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990),
is the controlling law for the certificate release inquiry (T. 56, 11, 50). The court then set bail at $10,000 for defendant's
release pending appeal of his securities fraud convictions to the
Utah Court of Appeals (T. 56). Defendant is currently free
pending resolution of that appeal.
The State appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals the
trial court's grant of a certificate of probable cause and
release pending appeal on the ground that the court had
erroneously applied rule 27, rather than section 77-20-10, as the
controlling substantive law for the certificate inquiry.

On July

10, 1991, the court of appeals transferred the case to this Court
in an order that read in pertinent part:
After review of the transcript of the
hearing below it is apparent that, in effect,
the trial court has held the statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (Supp. 1991) [sic],
unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly,
this appeal is within the original
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) (Supp. 1991)
and is hereby transferred, pursuant to Utah
R. App. P. 44.
Order of Transfer, Case No. 910172-CA (a copy of the entire order
2

A copy of the court's order granting the certificate of
probable cause is contained in Appendix A. That order is not
part of the record on appeal in this Court and does not appear to
be in the record on appeal in the court of appeals. The State
will locate the original order and move for its admission into
the record of this appeal.
3

is contained in Appendix B).

On September 18, 1991, this Court

formally accepted jurisdiction over the case in a minute entry
that read in pertinent part:
The court has determined that the trial
court declared a state statute
unconstitutional and that jurisdiction
therefore lies in the Supreme Court under
Section 78-2-2(3)(g), Utah Code Ann.
Therefore, the parties are directed to
proceed and to brief the issue of the
constitutionality of the statute involved,
section 77-20-10.
Minute Entry, Case No. 910314 (a copy of the entire minute entry
is contained in Appendix C ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Given the question presented for review, a statement of
facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case is
unnecessary.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously held that Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-20-10 (1990) is unconstitutional.

The statute is

constitutional as either a legislative enactment of substantive
law on a matter that is solely within the province of the
legislature or a valid amendment to rule 27, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah
Constitution.
Whether to allow for release pending appeal and the
conditions under which such release may occur are questions
solely within the province of the legislature.

Although the

courts have split on the issue of whether release pending appeal

4

is a matter of procedure or one of substantive law, the better
view is that the release question is a matter of substantive law
and therefore is controlled by statute.

Under this view, section

77-20-10 is a valid legislative enactment of substantive law, and
any conflicting provisions contained in rule 27 are ineffective.
Alternatively, if this Court concludes that the release
question is procedural and therefore subject to the Court's
rulemaking authority, section 77-20-10, which was approved by
two-thirds of both houses of the legislature, is a valid
amendment to rule 27 under article VIII, section 4.

The trial

court erroneously concluded that section 77-20-10 had not
received two-thirds approval.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-20-10 (1990) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IN THAT RELEASE PENDING
APPEAL IS GOVERNED SOLELY BY STATUTE;
ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF THE COURT MAY BY RULE
SET THE STANDARDS FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL,
THE LEGISLATURE MAY, UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, AMEND THE COURT'S RULE, AS IT
DID BY ENACTING SECTION 77-20-10 BY TWOTHIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court
erroneously ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (1990) is
unconstitutional.

Resolution of this issue is best arrived at by

first examining the recent history of the law concerning release
pending appeal and then analyzing the specific constitutional
questions presented.
A. History
In 1980, the legislature enacted comprehensive rules of
5

criminal procedure.

1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1; see Utah Code

Ann. §§ 77-35-1 through -33 (1982) (repealed effective July 1,
1990).

In an administrative order issued September 10, 1985,

this Court adopted all the existing statutory rules of procedure
M

[p]ursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4,

Constitution of Utah, as amended."3

In re: Rules of Procedure

and Evidence, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).

The

Court refined this order in a subsequent administrative order by
specifically adopting "all existing statutory rules of procedure
and evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 (1982
& Supp. 1988) not inconsistent with or superseded by rules of
procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court, with the
exception of section 77-35-12(g) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and
(d)."

In re: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 99 Utah Adv. Rep.

3 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
In 1989, the legislature repealed Chapter 35 of Title
77 effective July 1, 1990 and established a committee "to review
Chapter 35, Title 77, Code of Criminal Procedure to determine
which provisions should be reenacted as codified substantive law
under Article VIII, Utah Constitution."

1989 Utah Laws ch. 187,

3

Article VIII, section 4, as amended in 1984, provides in
pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of
procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage
the appellate process. The Legislature may
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of
two-thirds of all members of both houses of
the Legislature. . . .
6

§§ 14, 15; see Compiler's Note, Chapter 35, Title 77, Utah Code
Ann. (1990).

Since the passage of the legislation that repealed

chapter 35, the legislature has reenacted as codified substantive
law certain provisions of the former Code of Criminal Procedure
which are not pertinent to this appeal.

See Compiler's Notes,

Chapter 35, Title 77, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1991).
Prior to the enactment of the legislation repealing
chapter 35, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10
(1990).

1988 Utah Laws ch. 160, § 4.

That section provides in

pertinent part:
(1) The court shall order that a defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in jail
or prison, and who has filed an appeal or a
petition for a writ of certiorari, be
detained, unless the court finds:
(a) the appeal raises a
substantial question of law or fact
likely to result in:
(i) reversal;
(ii) an order for a new
trial; or
(iii) a sentence that
does not include a term
of imprisonment in jail
or prison;
(b) the appeal is not for the
purpose of delay; and
(c) by clear and convincing
evidence presented by the defendant
that he is not likely to flee the
jurisdiction of the court, and will
not pose a danger to the physical,
psychological, or financial and
economic safety or well-being of
any other person or the community
if released.
7

Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure has remained
unchanged since its enactment by the legislature in 1980 and
subsequent adoption by this Court.

It provides in pertinent

part:
•

• • •

(b) A certificate of probable cause shall
be issued if the court hearing the
application determines that there are
meritorious issues that should be decided by
an appellate court. . . .
In State v. Neelev, 707 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1985) (per curiam),
this Court held that under rule 27, the court must determine
whether the issue of fact or law is "substantial," that is,
whether it is either "(1) novel, i.e., there is no Utah precedent
that governs, or (2) fairly debatable," i.e., "if Utah precedent
bearing on the issue presents conflicting points of view when
applied to the facts of the case or is otherwise unclear."

Also,

the legal issue must be "integral to the conviction, e.g., if the
error in the proceedings below would be considered harmless, in
light of the precedent, the certificate should not issue."

Ibid.

The Court specifically rejected the State's suggestion that
"meritorious issues," as used in rule 27, be interpreted to mean
"'substantial questions of law or fact which, if determined
favorably to the defendant on appeal[,] are likely to result in
reversal or an order for a new trial.'" .Id. at 648 (citation
omitted).
And, in State v. Pappas, 696 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1985) (per
curiam), the Court held that once a defendant has presented a

8
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Constitutional Issues
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appeai only as prescribed

,

Utah C'nnst. art, I, § H (2)

See also McDermott, 547 A.2d at 1242 (no state constitutional
right to bail); Kordelski v. Cook, 621 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okl. Cr.
1980) (same).

Thus, the initial constitutional question is not

whether there is a constitutional right to release pending
appeal, but rather which branch of government, legislative or
judicial, has the ultimate authority to define the standards for
release pending appeal.

To decide this question, the Court must

consider whether release pending appeal is a matter of procedure,
which lies primarily within the province of the judiciary and its
rulemaking authority, or a matter of substantive law, which lies
exclusively within the province of the legislature.
Courts that have addressed this issue have reached
different conclusions.

For example, in People v. Williams, 143

111.2d 477, 577 N.E.2d 762 (1991), the Illinois Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional a statute similar to section 7720-10.

The supreme court had adopted a rule for release pending

appeal which provides that convicted defendants may be admitted
to bail on appeal at the discretion of "a judge of the trial or
reviewing court;" on the other hand, the Illinois Legislature had
enacted a statute which required the court to order a convicted
defendant held without bond pending appeal unless the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the defendant is not
likely to flee or pose a danger to others; (2) the appeal is not
for the purpose of delay; and (3) the appeal presents a
substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal
or an order for a new trial.

577 N.E.2d at 764-65. Relying on
10

the separation ^f powers provision of the Illinois Constitution,
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"fi i r e r f , J y a n d i r r v\ *" M M I I nil > I )

&-

HI f 1 I I "i I. "

Id. a t 7 6 5 . A l t h o u g h t h e court, did n o t explic: * .y state
proposition

^^LTIISI

y viewed the niair r r

* -eleas^ i
.- authoi . :. y n i

cedure committed sole-contr ,. cr • *- judiciary

Ibi d

a n o t h e r i: ecei i t opi i :i :i < u

Although " [t]he rigY : \* app.y t ;r

expl*:.t.j> pending appea]

I hf» ()h i. u Supreme (. on i I M > i •

clearl

:> • ?

substantia-

'^r

ail

<: * be

gra
u;e i . .: : * * apply f r release

legislature . ;ttempt

pending appeal •' r statute that conflicted with H M
t.ional.. i M ringed on the court's
- ...emaking authoi * <OI.JU

procedure

110! 5 r .
*

* -.s cour
\. u i 1

State ex rel. Silcott v. Spahr, 50 Ohio

-

" cvl tlidi,
.*....*

.

applying - :

! he

* r. 3 been committed

•• rulemaking authority by Section r. | P1.) Article IV,
. . . 1111111 II 1 I in 1 il 1 1 JII H1, tutional provision] also

clearly invalidates statutes that conflict with

aiid rules."

552 N.E.2d at u :MI (emphasis added).
11 :i State v. Currington

;^.

,. ^O^ " ^

942

(1985), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the question
"whether post-conviction

Lhin

I: :J le prerogative of the legislature, or is rather a procedural
consideration governed by the rules ci Ltf< . C O U X L . "

11

7

943.

Consistent with the position adopted in Williams and Spahr,

it held that the issue of bail pending appeal is "one of
procedure rather than of substantive law," and invalidated as an
infringement on the court's rulemaking authority a statute that
conflicted with a court rule by limiting in certain respects bail
pending appeal. JTd. at 944.
However, a number of courts have held that the matter
of bail pending appeal is one of substantive law which lies
solely within the province of the legislature, and therefore is
controlled by statute.

See, e.g., State v. Dist. Court of Second

Judicial Dist., 715 P.2d 191, 194-96 (Wyo. 1986); Willis v.
State, 492 N.E.2d 45, 46 (111. App. 1986); State v. Hawkins, 140
Ariz. 88, 680 P.2d 522, 523-24 (Ariz. App. 1984); Kordelski v.
Cook, 621 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okl. Cr. 1980).

As noted in Hawkins,

"'[s]ubstantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights; whereas the adjective, remedial or
procedural law is that which prescribes the method of enforcing
the right or obtaining redress for its invasion.'"

680 P.2d at

523-24 (quoting State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 110, 392 P.2d
775, 776 (1964)).

"[T]he right . . . to remain free pending

appeal [is] clearly a right and not a method of enforcing a right
or obtaining redress for its invasion."

Ibid.

Cf. Avila South

Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So.2d 599, 608 (Fla.
1977) (cited with approval in Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n. v.
Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983)).
These decisions represent the better view.
12
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Because "[t]he question of right to bail is wholly
substantive at the point of appeal,"

ibid., section 77-20-10

does not invade the rulemaking province of the judiciary.

The

people, acting through their legislature, have done nothing more
than they are entitled to do: balance the competing policy
considerations and define by statute the parameters of release
pending appeal.

Ibid.

Accordingly, this Court should hold that

the trial court erroneously invalidated section 77-20-10, that
the release pending appeal question is governed solely by
statute, and that insofar as rule 27 conflicts with the
substantive law contained in the statute, it is ineffective.

See

State v. Hawkins, 680 P.2d at 524.
Alternatively, even if this Court were to conclude that
the release pending appeal question involves only procedure
rather than substantive law, and therefore is subject to the
Court's rulemaking authority, section 77-20-10 is nevertheless a
constitutionally valid legislative amendment to rule 27 under
article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which permits
the legislature to amend the Court's rules of procedure and
evidence with the approval of two-thirds of both houses of the
legislature.

Both houses passed H.B. 79, which enacted section

77-20-10, by a two-thirds vote (House: 62 yeas, 4 nays, 9 absent
or not voting; Senate: 26 yeas, 0 nays, 3 absent).

House

Journal, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 247 (Jan. 26, 1988); Senate
Journal, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. 732 (Feb. 23, 1988).

There can be

little doubt that the legislature, by enacting section 77-20-10,
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CONCLUSION
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reverse the trial court's holding that section 7 7-20-10 is
unconstitutional and remand this case for reconsideration of the
re 1 ea se que s 1 i 11 11 \ 111»i
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OO0OO

STATE OF UTAH,

:
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE
: CAUSE

Plaintiff,
v.

:

C. DEAN LARSEN,

:
Case No. 891900927
: Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendant.

ooOoo
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on February
19, 1991, with the State of Utah represented by Robert N. Parrish,
Esq., and Defendant present and represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq.
Said

Petition

for

Certificate

of

Probable

Cause

related

to

Defendant's conviction of eighteen felony counts of Securities Fraud
contained in the Second Amended Information in the above-entitled
matter. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict on August 6, 1990.
The Court finds that Defendant is entitled to a Certificate
of Probable Cause pursuant to the provisions of Rule 27, U.R.CR.P.
based upon the fact that the Court determines there are several
1

n

„t.4wL~**>j«*fii*i
meritorious issues that ohould bo dooided by the appellate couart
in this ^natter.

Therefore, IT IS
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

That a Certificate of Probable Cause relating to the

Defendant's conviction on eighteen counts of Securities Fraud shall
issue as of February 19, 1991; and Defendant's sentence is stayed
pending a final disposition of the matter on appeal.
2.

As a condition of the issuance of said Certificate,

Defendant shall be required to comply with all previous Orders of
the Court regarding his release and shall post a surety bond in the
amount of $10,000.00. Said bond shall be posted or approved by the
Court no later than two weeks from the date of February 19, 1991.

3.

The Court finds that the aforementioned conditions of

admission to bail are sufficient to reasonably assure the appearance
of the Defendant as required by this Court or the appellate court,
and reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community
DATED this

y f l a y of

yX^£<£^1991.

HONf. LEONARD H. RUB'S

2
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JL 111991
OFF'.CE 0>

JUL J l 1991
Cf

IN THE UTAH COURT
RT OF APPEALS

^ j M « y T. Noontn

ooOoo

Oterk of th# Court
Utah Court ol Appeals

ORDER OF TRANSFER

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 910172-CA

v,
C. Dean Larsen,
Defendant and Appellee.

The court declines to summarily dismiss the appeal
herein. Plaintiff argues that its appeal is permitted under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(d) ("a judgment of the court
holding a statute . . . invalid.") See also Utah Rules Crim,
P. 26(3)(d) and 27(c). We make no determination whether the
trial court's order granting a certificate of probable cause is
a judgment appealable by the State.
After review of the transcript of the hearing below it is
apparent that, in effect, the trial court has held the statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (Supp. 1991), unconstitutional on its
face. Accordingly, this appeal is within the original
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(g) (Supp. 1991) and is hereby there transferred,
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 44.
Dated this

ID*

day of July, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

TO^^lSI^Tf^^^"'%

332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

September 18, 1991
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erp 10^991

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

u-.TiCE <•-/<

ATTORNEY GE.?*V" w,v

R. Paul VanDam
David B. Thompson
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capital Bldg.
BUILDING MAIL

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
C. Dean Larsen,
Defendant and Appellee.

"

No. 910314
891900927

The court has determined that the trial court declared a state
statute unconstitutional and that jurisdiction therefore lies in
the Supreme Court under Section 78-2-2(3)(g), Utah Code Ann.
Accordingly, the parties are directed to proceed and to brief the
issue of the constitutionality of the statute involved,
section 77-20-10.
Appellant's brief is due October 28, 1991,
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

